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Accountability Pressure, Academic Standards, and Educational Triage 
 
Abstract Body 
Background / Context: Educational accountability is in flux. Due to the failure of Congress to 
reauthorize NCLB, the Obama administration will soon grant waivers from the Act’s 
requirements. Therefore, it appears that states will gain some flexibility over how to hold schools 
and teachers accountable, provided they establish meaningful accountability while also raising 
standards. This mix of accountability and increasing standards could have unintended 
consequences for a phenomenon called educational triage. Status-based accountability systems 
such as NCLB hold schools accountable for test score levels (rather than growth or gain). In 
these systems, schools may face incentives to adopt triage practices, which involve assessing 
students’ likelihood to pass or fail a test and then diverting resources to those within reach of a 
passing test score, thus giving rise to what has become known as “educational triage” (e.g. 
Booher-Jennings, 2005; Brown & Clift, 2010). This could produce larger accountability 
treatment effects for students near grade level than students well below or well above grade 
level. The aim of this study is to determine whether educational triage becomes more 
pronounced when proficiency standards increase.  
Prior research shows that accountability pressure tends to increase student test scores 
(Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Chiang, 2009; Dee & Jacob, 2011; Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & Rouse, 
2006; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Jacob, 2005; Jacob & Lefgren, 2004; Reback, 2008; 
Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2011; Wong, Cook, & Steiner, 2009). A growing, but 
contradictory, literature examines the heterogeneity of treatment effects from accountability 
pressure, focusing particularly on whether all students will get equal benefits from accountability 
pressure (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Ladd & Lauen, 2010; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010). In a 
qualitative study from Texas, Booher-Jennings (2005) found that the ideology of data-driven 
decision making led teachers to focus instruction on the bubble kids, that is, those students just 
below grade level proficiency. Triage theory predicts larger accountability-induced test score 
gains for students near test score proficiency cut scores for students well below or well above the 
cut score. Quantitative studies of NCLB accountability from Washington State (Krieg, 2008) and 
of district-level and NCLB accountability from Chicago (Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010) report 
larger increases for students in the middle of the test score distribution than for low or high 
achieving students. Other quantitative studies find no evidence of educational triage favoring 
students in the middle of the test score distribution (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Ladd & Lauen, 2010; 
Reback, 2008; Reback, et al., 2011; Springer, 2008).  
Overlooked in existing research on educational triage is whether increasing educational 
standards and proficiency cut scores could increase incentives to triage. Consider two extreme 
scenarios. State A sets the proficiency level at the 5th percentile. State B sets the proficiency 
level at the 65th percentile. Because there are so few students below grade level in state A, we 
might not expect  accountability pressure to lead to large disparities in test score increases 
between students near grade level and students below grade level. Because standards are set so 
low in state A, however, we might expect a gap in the accountability-induced disparities between 
high and average achieving students. With many more students below grade level, the potential 
for accountability pressure to lead to a gap between middle and low achieving students is much 
greater in state B than in state A, whereas the potential for an accountability-induced gap 
between average and high achieving students is lower.  
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Purpose / Objective / Research Question / Focus of Study: this study aims to determine 
whether educational accountability promotes educational triage. This study exploits a natural 
experiment in North Carolina in which standards increased first in math in 2006 and second in 
reading in 2008 to determine whether an increase in educational standards caused an increase in 
educational triage at the expense of low and high achievers and to the benefit of students near 
grade level. We hypothesize that changing the rigor of state academic standards will have 
heterogeneous effects on student achievement. Triage theory predicts that under a status based 
system such as NCLB, students near grade level in schools that fail AYP will have larger 
increases than students well below or well above grade level. We hypothesize that the disparities 
between average achievers and low achievers and average achievers and high achievers will 
widen when the standards for defining grade level increase. In other words, triage will become 
worse when the tests become more difficult and the proficiency cut score increases.  
 
Setting: We conduct our study on the universe of North Carolina public schools. North 
Carolina had relatively low academic standards until the mid to late 2000s. In response to the 
wide disparity between state and NAEP test score results, policymakers increased standards first 
in math in 2006 and second in reading in 2008.  
Figure 1 shows the effect raising standards had on the percent of students at or above grade level 
in both subjects. In the year prior to the change in standards, 89% of students were proficient in 
math and 88% were proficient in reading. In the year subsequent to the change in standards, 
percent proficient in math and reading fell to 64 and 59, respectively. 
 
Population / Participants / Subjects: The study uses student-level micro data to examine the 
effect of accountability pressure on educational triage for all public school students enrolled in 
3rd through 8th grade between 2004 and 2009. The unit of analysis is a student level outcome 
nested within a school level treatment moderated by change in state standards and student 
position in the prior year’s test score distribution. The full analysis sample size is about 1.9 
million student-year observations nested within 7,200 school-year observations (about 500,000 
unique students and 1,800 unique schools). The sample is 57% white, 29% black, 7.6% Hispanic, 
14% academically gifted, 13% with special education needs, 46% eligible for free or reduced 
priced lunch. 
 
Intervention / Program / Practice: The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) mandates 
school-level accountability and public reporting of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). If any one 
of the nine federally identified subgroups (such as black, Hispanic, poor, or special needs 
students) fails performance targets, a school fails AYP. A school failing AYP for two 
consecutive years is deemed “in need of improvement” (INI). High poverty INI schools which 
receive federal funds (Title I schools) face an escalating set of sanctions, including offering 
students public school choice, tutoring, and the remote possibility of takeover or reconstitution as 
a charter school. Non-Title I schools face only public reporting of AYP status. Table 1 shows that 
North Carolina had large numbers of schools and students in treatment and control categories in 
both the pre and post period: 1,000-1,200 schools (400,000-500,000 students) failed AYP, 600-
800 schools (170,000-210,000 students) met AYP. With a difference-in-difference-in-difference 
(DDD) model we examine whether the effect of this treatment on student math and reading test 
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scores varies in two periods (lower and higher academic standards) and across three levels of 
student prior achievement (well below, near, and well above grade level).  
 
Research Design: We use a non-experimental research design in which estimates are produced 
from a DDD panel data model. We examine how the effect of school-based accountability 
pressure is moderated by plausibly exogenous changes in academic standards and student 
position in the prior test score distribution. We include school fixed effects in our model to 
remove between-school confounding that could arise from differential sorting of students into 
schools based on unobservables and unobservable fixed characteristics of schools such as the 
ability of a school to attract high quality teachers.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis: The study uses administrative records from the North Carolina 
Department of Public Instruction. The dependent variables are standardized math and reading 
end of grade test scores. North Carolina is a particularly appropriate state for this analysis 
because its tests are vertically equated, interval scaled, and directly linked to a statewide 
curriculum, have been in place since the early 1990s, and are the outcome for which schools are 
held accountable under NCLB. We standardize scores by grade level, subject, and year to 
facilitate interpretation of the magnitude of coefficients and to account for the fact that the math 
test was rescaled in 2006 and the reading test was rescaled in 2008.  
We use a DDD model which tests whether triage favoring students in the middle of the 
test score distribution--and at the expense of students well below and well above grade level--
becomes more pronounced after grade level proficiency standards increase:  
 
                                                            
                                                     
                                                              
                 (1) 
 
where A, a continuous standardized achievement score
1
 for student i in school s at time t is 
regressed on T, a school-level, time-varying, accountability threat 1-0 indicator variable, coded 1 
if student i’s school failed the AYP in the prior year; Post, a 1-0 indicator variable coded 1 if the 
student test score is from a year after an increase in academic standards for a particular subject;  
M1, a 1-0 indicator variable coded 1 if student i is at least 0.5 SD below grade level in the prior 
year; M2, a 1-0 indicator variable coded 1 if student i is at least 0.5 SD above grade level;   , a 
vector of school fixed effects; and  2 a vector of student characteristics. Because North Carolina 
went from relatively low to higher academic standards, we hypothesize that accountability 
threats would increase test scores for students near grade level more in the post period than in the 
pre-period. Therefore,    should be positive. Furthermore, we expect that the increase in 
academic standards would increase the accountability-induced gaps between students near grade 
level and those well below and well above grade level. Therefore, we hypothesize that       
and      . 
                                                 
1
 We examine test score levels rather than gains because NCLB holds schools accountable for test score levels and 
not gains.  
2
 Student-level variables included in the   vector include race, gender, gifted, special education, and LEP 
designations, and structural (i.e., switching to a school due to a change in grade configuration) and non-structural 
(i.e., switching to a school due to a residential move) school moves.  
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Estimating equation 1 without school fixed effects will produce consistent parameter 
estimates under two conditions: 1) no time-varying confounders of the outcome, and 2) no time-
invariant between-school confounding. The difference-in-difference estimation approach 
reduces, but does not eliminate, between-school confounding. We include school fixed effects to 
remove between-school heterogeneity that would otherwise bias the accountability effect. This 
approach estimates the effect of accountability pressure on successive cohorts of students in the 
same school. The specification shown in equation 1 uses only within-school variation across 
cohorts to produce estimates of accountability pressure. Therefore, those schools consistently 
failing or consistently attaining performance targets contribute nothing to the accountability 
pressure estimates. While this approach ignores the performance of schools with static treatment 
statuses, we view comparing the performance of cohorts exposed to accountability pressure to 
cohorts not exposed to such pressure who attended the same school at different points in time as 
more valid than comparing the performance of students in different schools. Time-varying 
school-level confounders that differ in the pre and post periods remain threats to the validity of 
our findings. Including school fixed effects buys us some, but not complete, protection from all 
possible sources confounding.  
 
Findings / Results: Figure 2 displays the primary parameters of interest from the school fixed 
effects DDD regressions shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. Consistent with the triage 
hypothesis, the figure shows positive effects for students at the margin of grade level (.216 SD in 
math and .068 SD in reading) and negative differential effects for students well below and well 
above grade level, with disparities larger in math than in reading. In math there is strong 
evidence that the increase in academic standards benefitted students near grade level more than 
low or high achieving students. In reading, the evidence is somewhat weaker, but it is clear that 
high achieving students benefitted less than students near or below grade level. In the complete 
version of this paper we plan to examine whether these effects vary by the number below-grade-
level students a school serves. In addition, we plan to present predicted values for low, average, 
and high achievers in both the pre and post period to more clearly assess the differential effects 
of increasing standards.  
 
Conclusions: As states move to increase academic rigor by adopting the Common Core 
Standards while also implementing changes in accountability policy, it is critical for education 
research on educational accountability from the NCLB era to inform policy design. Research has 
clearly shown small, but measurable, benefits from school-based accountability pressure. 
Research on the heterogeneity of school-based accountability pressure on students at different 
points in the prior achievement distribution is mixed, but has overlooked the role the rigor of 
academic standards may play in promoting or reducing the potential for educational triage. Our 
view is that school-based accountability based on test score level (instead of growth) is a 
necessary, but not sufficient cause of triage. In low standards states, the risk of triage harming 
low achieving students may be particularly low. As we have shown, however, raising academic 
standards can promote triage, especially in math. These findings suggest that states may want to 
take a gradual approach to increasing academic standards, which may be particularly important 
as the unit of accountability moves from the school to the individual teacher.  
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Appendix B. Tables and Figures 
Not included in page count. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Percent of Students at Grade Level Pre and Post Change in Math and Reading Standards. Note: 
in reading year 1-year 4 represents 2006-2009; in math year 1-year 4 represent 2004-2007.  
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Figure 2. Treatment Effects on Standardized Test Achievement (Math and Reading). Note: Figure created 
using school fixed effect models (2 and 4) from table 1. Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at 
p<.05.  
 
 
Table 1. Number of schools and students in schools failing AYP, by year (Reading) 
 Pre  Post 
 2006 2007  2008 2009 
Schools      
Met          721           749            794           636  
Failed        1,054         1,043          1,008         1,181  
      
Students      
Met    197,416     192,449      211,798     168,056  
Failed    419,240     451,944      440,269     486,664  
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Table 2. DDD Models Predicting Standardized Achievement 
 (1) Math  
Pooled OLS 
2004-2007 
(2) Math 
School FE 
2004-2007 
(3) Reading 
Pooled OLS 
2006-2009 
(4) Reading 
School FE 
2006-2009 
Black -0.267
***
 
(0.00491) 
-0.242
***
 
(0.00372) 
-0.257
***
 
(0.00414) 
-0.249
***
 
(0.00346) 
Hispanic -0.0194
**
 
(0.00614) 
-0.0145
**
 
(0.00455) 
-0.0695
***
 
(0.00482) 
-0.0708
***
 
(0.00402) 
Other Race -0.00275 
(0.0119) 
0.0194
***
 
(0.00565) 
-0.0513
***
 
(0.00941) 
-0.0414
***
 
(0.00368) 
Male 0.0386
***
 
(0.00152) 
0.0404
***
 
(0.00146) 
-0.0514
***
 
(0.00124) 
-0.0509
***
 
(0.00122) 
Academically Gifted 0.925
***
 
(0.00576) 
0.913
***
 
(0.00443) 
0.749
***
 
(0.00462) 
0.740
***
 
(0.00378) 
Special Education -0.295
***
 
(0.00408) 
-0.312
***
 
(0.00327) 
-0.288
***
 
(0.00372) 
-0.306
***
 
(0.00334) 
Limited English Proficiency -0.171
***
 
(0.00541) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.00447) 
-0.206
***
 
(0.00446) 
-0.217
***
 
(0.00386) 
Ever Retained -0.263
*** 
(0.00321) 
-0.258
***
 
(0.00294) 
-0.231
*** 
(0.00347) 
-0.230
***
 
(0.00327) 
Student Poverty -0.210
***
 
(0.00505) 
-0.155
***
 
(0.00212) 
-0.203
***
 
(0.00339) 
-0.160
***
 
(0.00199) 
Structural School Move -0.0423
***
 
(0.00634) 
-0.0721
***
 
(0.00481) 
-0.0658
***
 
(0.00442) 
-0.0624
***
 
(0.00337) 
Non-Structural School Move -0.0569
***
 
(0.00305) 
-0.0600
***
 
(0.00245) 
-0.0545
***
 
(0.00265) 
-0.0559
***
 
(0.00237) 
Post-Revised Standards 0.192
***
 
(0.0136) 
0.0832
***
 
(0.0105) 
0.369
***
 
(0.0101) 
0.329
***
 
(0.0104) 
Failed AYP 0.00521 
(0.00754) 
0.0666
***
 
(0.00834) 
-0.0468
***
 
(0.00691) 
-0.0551
***
 
(0.00775) 
Low Achievement -0.358
***
 
(0.00984) 
-0.347
***
 
(0.00993) 
-0.488
*** 
(0.00957) 
-0.475
***
 
(0.00950) 
High Achievement 0.920
***
 
(0.00866) 
0.863
***
 
(0.00665) 
0.899
***
 
(0.00752) 
0.858
***
 
(0.00613) 
Low Ach * Post -0.0373
*
 
(0.0148) 
-0.0515
***
 
(0.0148) 
-0.0741
***
 
(0.0120) 
-0.0710
***
 
(0.0116) 
High Ach * Post -0.115
***
 
(0.0103) 
-0.0787
***
 
(0.00920) 
-0.254
***
 
(0.00836) 
-0.234
***
 
(0.00826) 
Low Ach * Failed AYP 0.0120 
(0.0107) 
0.00652 
(0.0109) 
-0.0472
***
 
(0.0106) 
-0.0480
***
 
(0.0105) 
High Ach * Failed AYP -0.0544
***
 
(0.0114) 
-0.0180
*
 
(0.00876) 
-0.0362
***
 
(0.00865) 
-0.0146
*
 
(0.00701) 
Post * Failed AYP 0.119
***
 
(0.0152) 
0.216
***
 
(0.0118) 
0.0432
***
 
(0.0121) 
0.0682
***
 
(0.0121) 
Low Ach * Post * Failed AYP -0.0865
***
 
(0.0159) 
-0.0686
***a
 
(0.0159) 
-0.0137
b
 
(0.0137) 
-0.0160
c
 
(0.0133) 
High Ach * Post * Failed AYP -0.0768
***
 
(0.0122) 
-0.111
***a
 
(0.0106) 
-0.0550
***b
 
(0.00965) 
-0.0700
***c
 
(0.00936) 
Constant -0.589
***
 
(0.00791) 
-0.622
***
 
(0.00688) 
-0.433
***
 
(0.00666) 
-0.503
***
 
(0.00646) 
Observations 1,917,437 1,917,437 1,906,801 1,906,801 
R
2
 0.560 0.524 0.540 0.496 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001; a indicates two coefficients are 
significantly different at p<0.05; b indicates two coefficients are significantly different at p<0.01; c indicates two 
coefficients are significantly different at p<0.001. 
